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I. INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law encourages the creation and dissemination of “original 
works of authorship”1 by granting authors the exclusive rights of reproduc-
tion, distribution, public performance, and public display of their works.2 
Giving authors exclusive rights over their works gives them “a financial in-
centive to create informative, intellectually enriching works” in pursuit of 
the ultimate goal of copyright: “to expand public knowledge and understand-
ing.”3 One generally must get permission to use an author’s work,4 but par-
ties wishing to establish large digital collections of protected works are faced 
with the daunting task of obtaining permission for the use of every work that 
would be included in the collection.5 The sheer volume of works to be in-
cluded and the number of individual or collective licensing agreements that 
need to be established pose both a logistical nightmare and a commitment of 
resources that often render obtaining permission impossible.6 These barriers 
to obtaining permission have come to the forefront of copyright law as the 
legislative and judicial branches have dealt with the question of how to pro-
tect the exclusive rights granted to authors in the face of mass collections of 
digitized works.7 
 
 1.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2017). 
 2.  See id. § 106. 
 3.  Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter “Authors Guild 
2d”]. Of course, not all works are intellectually enriching, perhaps some even detract from the public 
knowledge, but copyright does not discriminate. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 U.S. 
239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of [works], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”). Any 
work that is “fixed in any tangible medium of expression” from which it can be perceived or communi-
cated is granted copyright protection upon fixation. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 4.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (noting that only the copyright owner has the right “to do or authorize” 
any of the exclusive rights, subject to some limitations); see also id. § 501 (“Anyone who violates any of 
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as 
the case may be.”). 
 5.  KEVIN AMER & CHRIS WESTON, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS 
DIGITALIZATION 1 (2015) (calling it practically impossible to obtain permission on a work-by-work ba-
sis).  
 6.  Id. at 5 (noting that the cost of obtaining permission “from every rightsholder individually often 
will exceed the value of the use to the user”). 
 7.  See, e.g., Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 202, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1658 (2016). 
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There are “enormous cultural, intellectual, and educational benefits” as-
sociated with greater access to expressive works through digital collections.8 
Promoting digitization efforts would allow libraries and other entities to pre-
serve works and enhance access to them for non-consumptive research pur-
poses.9 Universities could devote less real estate to physical libraries and 
more easily distribute works to increasingly technology-dependent students 
while avoiding the expense of maintaining physical collections.10 Millions 
of out-of-print books would become digitally available for all readers, which 
is especially beneficial to print-disabled persons and for readers in remote 
locations without access to leading research libraries.11 Authors and publish-
ers are likely to benefit from the increased access to their works, as end-users 
will be directed to websites where they can purchase copies of the books, 
potentially creating a new market for and reviving previously out-of-print 
works.12 Most importantly, digitization of works will preserve the collective 
knowledge of mankind as expressed in copyright protected works and allow 
greater access for individuals to tap into that collective knowledge. 
Adaptation of copyright law in response to new technology is a matter 
best suited for congressional intervention and will likely be required to facil-
itate mass digitization of copyright protected works.13 Congress has repeat-
edly amended copyright statues in attempt to strike a balance between copy-
right owners’ interests in controlling and exploiting their works and society’s 
interests in the free flow of information, ideas, and expressions.14 Digitiza-
tion projects promote the expansion of the collective knowledge but face 
several copyright barriers, to which a solution is “desperately needed.”15  
This note outlines a new exception to the exclusive rights of reproduc-
tion and display to allow parties to digitize collections of protected works. 
This exception applies if the digitizing parties can show that the circum-
stances of the project render obtaining permission impossible, and if they 
 
 8.  Matthew Sag, The Google Books Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 19, 73 (2010). 
 9.  Pamela Samuelson, The Google Books Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 479, 
561 (2011). 
 10.  Id. at 494. 
 11.  Sag, supra note 8, at 73. 
 12.  Id. (“[Google Books] promises new ways to profit from out-of-print works, as well as the pos-
sibility that increased access will draw in new readers and open up niche markets.”). 
 13.  See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 676–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). It is 
well established that is up to Congress “to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.” 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003). 
 14.  See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429–31 (1984) (explaining 
the difficulty in balancing competing societal and personal interests in works and highlighting specific 
amendments to the Copyright Act). 
 15.  AMER & WESTON, supra note 5, at 105. 
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pay reasonable royalties for the use of the works included in the collection. 
The exception is inspired by and adopts provisions from several existing and 
previously proposed solutions which are discussed first. 
II. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR DIGITIZATION: EXISTING 
POSSIBILITIES & PRIOR PROPOSALS 
A. Existing Possibilities: Fair Use & Exceptions to the Exclusive 
Rights 
Several limitations ensure that copyright protection does not hinder the 
ability of the public to tap into the collective knowledge and generate crea-
tive works. Only original elements are protected by copyright in the first 
place, which ensures that underlying facts and ideas remain free to the public, 
and that no author has the power to suppress or control information of soci-
etal importance, such as historical information, data, and mathematical for-
mulas.16 Phrases, situations, storylines, and other expressive elements com-
mon to a class of work are also not protectable, which enables all potential 
authors working in that class to utilize them.17 There are also categories of 
works, such as statutes or judicial opinions, that are not protected because 
public policy dictates that they be freely available to the public.18 
Copyright owners also are not given absolute exclusionary control over 
the protected portions of their works because this “would tend . . . to limit, 
rather than expand, public knowledge.”19 The public may use protected ele-
ments of copyrighted works if the use is so minimal that it does not expro-
priate the exclusive rights from the copyright owner.20 In general, this means 
the public may build upon copyright protected works when generating their 
own works, unless it is clear to a jury of reasonable persons that the second 
work copied a substantial portion of the original work.21 In the context of 
mass digital collections, digitizing parties topically reproduce entire works, 
so they will not be able to convince a jury that the copying is insubstantial. 
 
 16.  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 340–41 (1991). The expression of 
facts or ideas can be protected if the expression is original and there are multiple ways of expressing the 
facts or ideas, otherwise the expression merges with the underlying facts or ideas and is not protected. 
See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs. Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 70–72 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 17.  See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 18.  See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 593 (1834) (“No reporter of the decisions of the 
supreme court has, nor can he have, any copyright in the written opinions delivered by the court: and the 
judges of the court cannot confer on any reporter any such right.”). 
 19.  Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (“[G]iving authors absolute control over all 
copying from their works would tend . . . to limit, rather than expand, public knowledge.”). 
 20.  See, e.g., Gottlieb Dev. LLC v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 21.  See id. 
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However, they may be able to benefit from an existing limitation to the ex-
clusive rights, namely the fair use doctrine, or an express exception to the 
exclusive rights.22 
1. The Fair Use Doctrine 
One may use copyright protected works without permission “for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, 
[] research,”23 or any other use that is determined to be a fair use.24 
 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any par-
ticular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.25 
 
The factors present no bright-line rules, but rather they serve as guide-
lines, each of which the judicial branch has fleshed out over the years.26 The 
first factor weighs in favor of a finding of fair use when the secondary work 
is non-commercial and serves a new or further function than the original, 
usually by transforming or adding something new to, rather than merely cop-
ying, the original.27 That is to say transformative works that comment upon, 
criticize, parody, provide information about, or serve a different function 
than the original are likely to be considered fair use.28 The second factor is 
likely to favor fair use when the original work is non-fiction or was published 
prior to the secondary use.29 The third factor generally favors a finding of 
 
 22.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22 (2012). 
 23.  Id. § 107. 
 24.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The text [of section 107] 
employs the terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ in the preamble paragraph to indicate the illustrative and not 
limitative function of the examples given.”) (citation omitted). 
 25.  17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 26.  Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 27.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79. 
 28.  Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 214–16 (describing the application of factor one in past cases). 
 29.  Bryan Oberle, Note, The Online Archive: Fair Use and Digital Reproductions of Copyrighted 
Works, 25 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 753, 756 (2016). 
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fair use when the secondary work uses qualitatively insignificant portions of 
or quantitatively insignificant amounts of a work.30 The final factor favors a 
finding of fair use when the secondary work cannot serve as a replacement 
for the original and has little or no effect on the market for the original.31 
The fair use analysis is fact intensive. Moreover, the factors are consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis and, while no one factor is dispositive, the fac-
tors are often intertwined.32 For example, factor one calls for a transformative 
or non-commercial use, in part, because they do not serve as a replacement 
for the original use and therefore it will not shrink the market for the original, 
which is the primary consideration of factor four.33 Likewise, the more sig-
nificant the amount and quality of the work is copied, (the third factor) the 
less likely it is that the second work is transformative (the first factor) and 
the more likely it is that market demand for the original is depleted (the 
fourth factor). The interrelated nature of the factors and the case-by-case ap-
plication of fair use renders the doctrine a powerful but unpredictable de-
fense for unauthorized uses. 
Recently, the Second Circuit found that the searchable collection behind 
Google Books constitutes a fair use of the millions of books copied into a 
digital format to establish the collection.34 The Court noted that the searcha-
ble nature of Google Books and the snippet view—which displays just 
enough of a book to give an end-user the context needed to determine 
whether a book is relevant to his or her search query—were “highly trans-
formative.”35 The court stressed that Google Books, in its current form, pro-
vides information about and access to books without serving as a meaningful 
replacement for the books, thereby imposing limited market harm for the 
copyright protected books.36 
The outcome of the Google Books case was far from predictable be-
cause prior cases dealing with digitization of protected works reached differ-
ent outcomes. In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., the Ninth Circuit ruled that a 
 
 30.  Id. at 756–57. The factor is more ambiguous when the secondary use copies a large amount of 
substantively insignificant portions of a work or a minimal amount of substantively significant portions 
of the work. See Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (finding that copying 
of an insignificant amount of President Ford’s memoir was not fair use because the portion copied was 
the most significant and most interesting portion, or the “heart” of the work). 
 31.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568. When considering the market, one must consider all potential 
markets, including those for derivative works, and must consider the market effects if the allegedly in-
fringing practice or use became widespread. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590–92. 
 32.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78. 
 33.  Id. at 591 (noting that when a work is transformative, it is less likely to serve as a “market 
substitution . . . and market harm may not be so readily inferred.”). 
 34.  See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 35.  Id. at 217–18. 
 36.  Id. at 220, 224–25. 
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search engine that copies images from open websites and displays thumb-
nails of the images in response to end-user queries is fair use.37 A similar 
case involving thumbnail images of photos posted without the copyright 
owner’s permission affirmed that searchable databases of thumbnail images 
are a fair use.38 Both of the thumbnail cases relied heavily on the fact that the 
searchable database is transformative and increases access to the copyright 
protected work without supplanting the market for the original39 and both 
suggest that Google Books is a fair use. Conversely, in American Geophysi-
cal Union v. Texaco, the Second Circuit ruled that photocopying research 
articles from technical journals was not a fair use, despite the educational 
purposes of the copying.40 A database of sound recordings established to pro-
vide end-users an MP3 copy of music that they already owned in different 
formats was also found not to be a fair use due to the wholesale copying and 
storage of the music.41 The Texaco and MP3 cases seem to suggest that 
Google Books is not a fair use. In holding that the methodology of Google 
Books is a fair use, the Second Circuit supplied one more data point on the 
smorgasbord of fair use cases but does little to clearly define the law for 
future digitization projects. This is clear by the disclaimer that the fair use 
status of Google Books pertains to the search function and snippet view “as 
presently designed,” which indicates that a digital database that displays 
slightly more than a snippet of a work or otherwise varies from the design 
may not benefit from a similar finding of fair use.42 The doctrine of fair use 
is far from stable and predictable and therefore should not be the sole means 
by which digitization efforts are pursued.43 
2. Exceptions to Exclusive Rights & Copyright Liability 
Exceptions to the exclusive rights have developed over the years as new 
technologies and uses have questioned the scope of the limited monopoly 
granted by copyright law.44 The current exceptions do not directly provide 
protection for a party wishing to establish a digital collection of works, but 
they might serve as models for an exception tailored to allow mass 
 
 37.  Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 38.  See Perfect10 v. Google, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165–68 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 39.  Id.; see also Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818–23; Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 
2006) (finding a web-crawler that searches and displays texts from websites is a fair use). 
 40.  Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 930–31 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 41.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13293, *10–13 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 42.  See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 202, 212–25 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 43.  AMER & WESTON, supra note 5, at 76–77. 
 44.  See, e.g., Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 212–13.  
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digitization projects for which obtaining permission from authors is logisti-
cally impossible. 
The Library and Archive Exception, for example, allows qualifying li-
braries or archives to make one to three copies of a work to replace damaged, 
deteriorating, lost, or stolen copies of works contained in their collections; 
to deposit works in another library or archive for research purposes; or to 
preserve and secure the work for future generations.45 The exception would 
not extend to new digitization projects because the library or archive may 
only reproduce works they already own and only allows for creation of dig-
ital copies of works that are not already available in digital format.46 A sim-
ilar exception allows qualifying entities to reproduce and distribute works in 
specialized formats for use by sight impaired or otherwise disabled individ-
uals,47 but would not allow general reproduction for the creation of a digital 
collection. 
The Nondramatic Musical Works Exception is an example of a com-
pulsory license exception that allows complying parties to produce and dis-
tribute new versions of phonorecord48 works that have already been publicly 
distributed by the copyright owner of the underlying musical work.49 To ob-
tain a compulsory license, a user must be reproducing and distributing the 
phonorecords for private use and can only reproduce the phonorecord in a 
manner that does not alter “the basic melody or fundamental character of the 
work.”50 Parties must also serve notice, to the Copyright Office, or to identi-
fied copyright owners of each work, of their intention to obtain a compulsory 
license and to distribute copies of a new recording of the work.51 Copyright 
Royalty Judges—three full-time judges appointed by the Librarian of Con-
gress—determine reasonable royalty rates for compulsory license based ex-
ceptions and authorize the distribution of royalties to copyright owners 
whose rights are implicated.52 The royalties are ideally calculated at an 
 
 45.  17 U.S.C. § 108 (a)–(c) (2012). 
 46.  Id. (explaining that digital copies must also be confined to use within the premises of the library 
or archive). 
 47.  See id. § 121. 
 48.  A phonorecord includes a CD, cassette tape, or any other “material object in which sounds, 
other than those accompanying a motion picture or audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known 
or later developed, and from which the sound can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” 
Id. § 101. 
 49.  See id. § 115. 
 50.  Id. § 115(a). 
 51.  Id. § 115(b). 
 52.  Id. § 801(b)(1), (b)(3) (describing the general function of Copyright Royalty Judges); see also 
id. § 115(c)(3)(C)–(E) (describing the Copyright Royalty Judges’ roles in determining reasonable royalty 
rates for nondramatic musical works compulsory licenses). Copyright owners can participate in proceed-
ings in front of the Copyright Royalty Judges to help determine the royalty rates. See id. § 804(a), (b)(4). 
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amount that (1) maximizes the availability of the creative works for the pub-
lic; (2) provides the copyright owner and the licensee fair economic returns 
under existing conditions; (3) reflects the relative roles of the copyright 
owner and the licensee with respect to creative contribution, technological 
contribution, capital investment, risk, cost, and contribution to the opening 
of new markets for the work; and (4) minimizes any disruptive impacts of 
the structure of the industry.53 The copyright owners are then entitled to re-
ceive royalties for the reproduction and distribution of their works, but only 
if they register with the Copyright Office and only for copies made or dis-
tributed after their registration with the Copyright Office.54 Existing compul-
sory license exceptions do not allow for development of digital collections, 
but provide a framework for the collection and distribution of royalties owed 
to a large number of copyright owners, which may be useful in digital col-
lections. 
Congress has also enacted safe harbors specifically for internet service 
providers (ISPs) who provide online services or network access to the pub-
lic.55 Under the safe-harbors, ISPs are not liable for copyright infringement 
caused by (1) the ISP automatically transmitting, routing or providing con-
nections for material initiated at the direction of someone other than the ISP; 
(2) intermediate and temporary storage of material made available by a per-
son other than the ISP; (3) storage of material provided by someone other 
than the ISP on a system or network operated by the ISP; or (4) the ISP re-
ferring or linking an end-user to an online location containing infringing ma-
terial.56 To qualify for one of the safe harbors, an ISP must adopt a policy to 
terminate repeat infringers from accessing the system or network and must 
accommodate standard technological measures designed to identify and pro-
tect copyright protected works.57 If infringing activity is apparent to the ISP 
or if a copyright owner notifies the ISP of infringing activity, the ISP has to 
disable access to or remove any allegedly infringing material.58 If the alleg-
edly infringing material was provided by an end-user of a system or network, 
the ISP must notify the end-user of the removal and facilitate communication 
between the end-user and the copyright owner if there is a dispute as to the 
 
 53.  Id. § 801(b)(1)(A)–(D). 
 54.  See id. § 115 (c)(1) (“The owner is entitled to royalties for phonorecords made and distributed 
after being [identified in the Copyright Office records], but is not entitled to recover for any phonorecords 
previously made and distributed.”). 
 55.  Id. § 512(k)(1)(B). 
 56.  See id. § 512(a)–(d). 
 57.  Id. § 512 (i). 
 58.  Id. § 512 (g)(1). 
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infringing nature of the material.59 The ISP safe-harbors provide guidance 
for managing digital collections and preventing infringement by end-users 
of digital collections. 
B. Prior Legislative Proposals  
The concerns surrounding digital collections have previously been ad-
dressed by many commentators, the Copyright Office, and Congress; even 
so, no bills addressing the issues have been enacted.60 Prior Legislative pro-
posals have generally fallen into three categories: limiting liability, extend-
ing collective licensing efforts, or creating exceptions to the exclusive 
rights.61 
1. Limited Liability Approaches 
Bills introduced in both the 109th Congress and the 110th Congress 
recommended amending the Copyright Act to limit the remedies available 
for certain unauthorized uses.62 The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 
200863 came closest to being adopted, it would have limited remedies when 
four conditions are met: (1) the protected works are used in good faith; 
(2) the user has performed a “reasonably diligent search” for the copyright 
owners; (3) the user properly attributes to authors whenever possible; and (4) 
the user includes a copyright notice with any public distribution, display, or 
use of a protected work.64 A reasonably diligent search was further defined 
to require a search of the Copyright Office records, of additional subscrip-
tion-based databases, of other resources that are reasonable and appropriate 
under the circumstances, and in compliance with Recommended Practices to 
 
 59.  Id. § 512 (g)(2) (requiring an ISP to notify the user that it has removed allegedly infringing 
material and to notify the copyright owner if the user submits a counter notification alleging the non-
infringing nature of the use or activity). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Many commentators suggest that fair use and the existing exceptions are sufficient to cover 
orphan use or digitization efforts. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing fair use and why it is inadequate for 
digitization projects). 
 62.  See, e.g., Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008); Orphan 
Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008); Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. 
(2006); see also AMER & WESTON, supra note 5, at 11–13 (discussing the 2006 and 2008 Congressional 
proposals). 
 63.  See generally 154 CONG. REC. S9867 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2008) (reporting that the act unani-
mously passed the Senate). The Bill focuses on orphan works, those with no known author, but the pro-
posal may be adapted for digitization projects because the same underlying issue, impossibility of obtain-
ing author permission, plagues digitization projects and use of orphan works. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), https://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf. 
 64.  See AMER & WESTON, supra note 5, at 12. 
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be set by the Register of Copyrights.65 Complying users would only be sub-
ject to injunctions to prevent or restrain infringement;66 however, users fail-
ing to make a reasonably diligent search for copyright owners as defined by 
the statute would be subject to full liability.67 
In the 2015 Report on Orphan Works and Mass Digitalization, the Cop-
yright Office recommends a limited liability approach similar to the prior 
bills and the four conditions outlined above remain in the heart of the current 
proposal. 68 Additionally, the recommendation requires a user to file a de-
scription of the works used, a summary of the search for the authors, the 
sources of the works, any identifying data available to the user, and the name 
and description of the user.69 Users that comply with the requirements of the 
proposal would be liable for reasonable monetary compensation rather than 
actual or statutory damages if the copyright owner of the work later comes 
forward.70 
The current recommendation also further defines a “reasonably diligent 
search” for copyright owners and proposes best practices for doing so.71 In 
short, in performing a search, a user must utilize (1) the Copyright Office’s 
online records; (2) reasonably available sources of copyright ownership and 
authorship; (3) technology tools and expert assistance when reasonable; and 
(4) appropriate databases.72 The requirements serve as guidelines and the re-
quired search would change depending on the facts and circumstances of a 
particular case.73 The Copyright Office would also have the authority to gen-
erate Recommended Practices for locating authors for each category of work 
(e.g., different standards for literary works and pictorial works) and to mod-
ify the Recommendations based on feedback from interested stakeholders.74 
 
 65.  See S. 2913 sec. 2, § 514(b). Nonprofit educational institutions, museums, libraries, archives, 
or public broadcasting entities would have been exempt from the search requirements if their use was 
noncommercial and primarily educational, religious, or charitable in nature and they promptly ceased use 
of the work upon receiving notice of infringement. Id. § 514(c)(1)(B). 
 66.  Id. § 514(c)(2)(B). 
 67.  Unless the user added a significant amount of original content to the work, paid reasonable 
compensation for the use, and provided attribution to the owner of the work when requested, in which 
case he or she is not subject to an injunction. Id. § 514(c)(1). 
 68.  AMER & WESTON, supra note 5, at 40, 50–72. 
 69.  Id. at 60–61. 
 70.  Id. at 63. The proposal also limits injunctive relief for derivatives based on supposed orphan 
works, but generally allows injunctive relief for the use of original orphan works. Id. at 67. 
 71.  Id. at 56–60. 
 72.  Id. at 57. 
 73.  Notice that each of these requirements is qualified by phrases such as “when reasonable” or 
“appropriate.” Id. at 57–58. 
 74.  Id. at 59. 
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2. Collective Licensing Approaches 
Collective licensing approaches are comparable to the existing compul-
sory licensing exceptions described above75 except users negotiate with pri-
vate collective licensing organizations to obtain the right to use classes of 
protected works rather than adhering to terms set by statute and by the Cop-
yright Royalty Judges. Collective licensing agreements are binding upon en-
tire classes of copyright owners unless or until individual owners opt-out of 
the agreement.76 Users generally pay a flat royalty fee to collective licensing 
organizations who then redistribute the funds to represented copyright own-
ers or, if the copyright owner is unknown or unreachable, direct funds to 
organizations involved in protecting copyright interests and promoting de-
velopment of new creative works.77 For example, the Nordic countries have 
followed this approach for several decades to support socially beneficial un-
dertakings such as libraries, archives, and museums, and to allow reproduc-
tion for educational or internal business purposes.78 
The Copyright Office currently recommends a collective licensing pilot 
program to evaluate the effectiveness of collective licensing in accommodat-
ing digitization projects in the United States.79 The pilot program would al-
low collective licensing organizations to represent the rights of members and 
non-members of the organization when negotiating royalties for digitization 
projects involving literary works, pictorial or graphical works embedded in 
literary works, and photographs and would be limited to digitization projects 
with nonprofit, educational, and research purposes.80 Collective licensing or-
ganizations would have to seek authorization from the Copyright Office by 
proving their representativeness in the relevant field, the consent of their 
members to representation, and their adherence to transparency, accounta-
bility, and governance standards.81 
A central problem with the collective licensing approach is that authors 
may never be located or identified and the money collected for their benefit 
will never reach them.82 Collecting funds without redistributing or exploiting 
 
 75.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 76.  AMER & WESTON, supra note 5, at 18–19. 
 77.  Id. at 49. 
 78.  Id. at 18–19. 
 79.  Id. at 83. The Copyright Office is currently seeking public comments on the proposal. Id. at 
104. 
 80.  Id. at 83–84. 
 81.  Id. at 104. 
 82.  Id. at 50 (Collective licensing “would end up ultimately as a system to collect fees, but with no 
one to distribute them to, potentially undermining the value of the whole enterprise”). 
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them does little to promote the creation or enjoyment of creative works or 
protect the rights of copyright owners. 
3. Exception-Based Approaches 
The United States has not seriously considered exception-based legis-
lation for digitization, but the European Union (“EU”) recently adopted a 
Directive,83 structured as a statutory exception to the rights of reproduction 
and display, to promote digitization projects.84 The EU Directive allows an 
entity to digitize works if the entity qualifies as a public service organiza-
tion,85 and allows private organizations to partner with a qualifying public 
service organization to generate revenue for and further the mission of the 
public service organization.86 The EU Directive is limited in application: tex-
tual, audiovisual, and cinematographic works qualify for the exception out-
right whereas graphic works are included only if they are incorporated in a 
qualifying work.87 Similar to the limited liability approaches, described 
above, the EU Directive requires users to make a reasonably diligent search 
for copyright owners;88 however, if copyright owners are later identified or 
come forward, the user is not entitled to limited liability and must provide 
fair compensation to the copyright owners for prior use and obtain permis-
sion for future use.89 What constitutes a reasonably diligent search is a matter 
left to each EU state as they adopt the EU Directive, but generally users must 
make a good faith attempt to locate the copyright holder and document their 
search strategies and results on an online database.90 
Exception-based solutions generally have the benefit of providing clear 
and detailed circumstances in which users can access or use copyright pro-
tected works without infringing upon the exclusive rights, but they may be 
over- or under-inclusive depending on the way the statute defines the cir-
cumstances, works, uses, and users that are included in the exception. 
 
 83.  See id. at 21. The Copyright Office is reporting that Australia is close to adopting a similar 
approach. Id. at 47. 
 84.  Directive 2012/28 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on Certain 
Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, art. 1(1), 2012 O.J. (L 299) 8, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriS-
erv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:299:0005:0012:EN:PDF [hereinafter “EU Exception-Based Di-
rective”]. 
 85.  Public Service Organization is defined as a publicly accessible library, educational establish-
ment, museum, archive, film or audio heritage institution, or public service broadcasting archive, that has 
a non-commercial public service mission. Id. at 8. 
 86.  AMER & WESTON, supra note 5, at 21. 
 87.  Pamela Samuelson, Jennifer M. Urban, David R. Hansen, Kathryn Hashimoto & Gwen Hinze, 
Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 36 (2013) [herein-
after “Urban”]. 
 88.  EU Exception-Based Directive, supra note 84, arts. 2(1), 3, at 9. 
 89.  Urban, supra note 87, at 37. 
 90.  Id. 
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Ambiguity in the wording of the exceptions can also lead to uncertainty in 
applying the exception and lead to litigation.91  
Supplementing the EU Directive’s exception-based approach with the 
recording and author-location requirements of the limited liability ap-
proaches as well as the centralized management of the collective licensing 
approaches, and incorporating the framework of the existing compulsory li-
censes and safe-harbors may be the most effective solution for U.S. copy-
right law to promote digitization projects while protecting the exclusive 
rights of copyright owners. 
III. AN EXCEPTION-BASED PROPOSAL FOR PROMOTING 
DIGITIZATION OF PROTECTED WORKS 
An exception to the reproduction and display rights for the creation of 
collections comprised of digitally reproduced works is proposed, wherein the 
Copyright Office pre-authorizes digitization projects and authorized digitiz-
ing parties pay a reasonably royalty for use of the works included in a digital 
collection. Under the exception, a digitizing party is permitted to reproduce 
a work in its entirety for the purposes of generating the digital collection and 
to display works to a degree suitable to enable the intended use of the col-
lection but not to enable end-users of the collection to copy, retain, or use a 
work in a manner exceeding a fair use.92 The exception is limited to pub-
lished literary works, works embedded in such literary works, and published 
photographs,93 and to digitization projects that are primarily intended to di-
rect end-users to legal avenues of obtaining original copies of included works 
and digitization projects otherwise providing a societal benefit without serv-
ing as a replacement for the original works.94 The digitizing party may be 
private or public as long as they comply with the qualifications and require-
ments of the exception.95 
 
 91.  AMER & WESTON, supra note 5, at 77. 
 92.  This limitation is intended to give digitizing parties the right to reproduce works in a manner 
that exceeds a fair use, but retains fair use as the standard for end users of the digital collection. 
 93.  This tracks the recommendation of the Copyright Office collective licensing approach, see su-
pra Part II.B.2, and recognizes an author’s exclusive right to determine how and when a work is first 
published. See also Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985). 
 94.  Future digital projects are unforeseeable so it would be premature to attempt to define societal 
benefit. Whether a use is societally beneficial and whether it serves as a replacement for the original can 
be guided by fair use guidelines, see supra Part II.A.1, and may be an area in which the Copyright Office 
shall promulgate clear rules for qualification. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 95.  The nature of the digitizing party (religious, nonprofit, educational, etc.) should be considered 
in determining the societal benefit a digital collection provides, but the exception is available for all dig-
itizing parties. 
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A. Qualifications for & Requirements of the Proposed Exception 
1. Impossibility of Obtaining Permission & Copyright Office 
Authorization 
The essential requirement for the exception is that the Copyright Office 
must approve a digitization project based on a showing that obtaining per-
mission from the copyright owners whose rights are implicated is impossi-
ble. The digitizing party has the burden of proving impossibility, which re-
quires a showing that it is logistically unreasonable or prohibitively 
expensive to obtain individual permission from every owner whose work is 
included in the proposed digital project. Before the digitizing party can make 
this argument, they must perform a reasonably diligent attempt to locate cop-
yright owners, including a search of: Copyright Office records, additional 
subscription-based databases, other resources that are reasonable and appro-
priate under the circumstances, and other Recommended Searches to be set 
by the Register of Copyrights.96 The digitizing party must also submit a de-
tailed description of the digitization project including how the digitizing 
party and end-users of the digital collection will use the digitized works and 
what classes of works are included in the project. 
The Copyright Office will determine the impossibility of obtaining per-
mission—to grant or deny eligibility for this exception—on a case-by-case 
basis depending on the number of copyright owners whose rights are impli-
cated, the anticipated costs of locating and negotiating with each owner, the 
inclusion of pseudonymous, anonymous, or other works for which the author 
is unreachable, and any other relevant factors.97 When the Copyright Office 
authorizes a digitization project, the qualified digitizing party must submit a 
digital copy of each work included in the project and a disclosure concerning 
included works. The disclosure should include all known information per-
taining to the copyright status of each work including, for example, the iden-
tity of the author or owner and the remaining duration of the copyright term 
or the publication date of the work. 
 
 96.  The search requirements here are identical to those required by the prior limited liability pro-
posals. See, e.g., Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. sec. 2, § 514(b) (2008); 
see supra Part II.B.1. The requirement is intended to ensure that the finding of impossibility is not merely 
speculative. 
 97.  See AMER & WESTON, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that the cost of obtaining permission “from 
every rightsholder individually often will exceed the value of the use to the user”); see also id. at 73 
(noting that it is a “practical impossibility” to obtain permission for digitization projects based on these 
factors). 
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2. Reasonable Royalties Set by Copyright Royalty Judges 
The existing Copyright Royalty Judges will set a reasonable royalty that 
digitizing parties must pay for the inclusion of works in their digital collec-
tions.98 The royalty would be set to maximize the availability of the creative 
works for digital collections; provide the copyright owner and the digitizing 
party fair economic returns under existing conditions; reflect the relative 
roles of the copyright owner and the digitizing party with respect to creative 
contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, risk, cost, and 
contribution to the opening of new markets for the work; and minimize any 
disruptive impacts of the structure of the industry for the original work.99 The 
royalty may vary depending on the classification of the digital collection, the 
works involved, the end-use of the collection, or a combination thereof. 
The reasonably royalties would be paid to the Copyright Office who 
would then redistribute funds100 to all known copyright owners whose works 
are included in a digital collection.101 Copyright owners are identified by the 
submissions from digitizing parties—who were required to perform a rea-
sonably diligent search for owners, as described above—and by information 
supplied directly from copyright owners who are incentivized to register with 
the Copyright Office by the fact that they only receive the royalty payments 
after they have been identified.102 Any excess funds collected in relation to 
works with unknown or unreachable authors to whom the Copyright Office 
cannot distribute funds, may be invested in the Copyright Office for purposes 
of overseeing this exception, searching for owners of protected works, and 
other costs associated with Copyright Office administration.103 
3. Digital Safeguards Protecting the Exclusive Rights of Copy-
right Owners 
There are three related requirements that protect of the exclusive rights 
of copyright owners whose works are included in digital collections. The 
first is that digitizing parties are required to continually maintain and monitor 
 
 98.  This is inspired by the compulsory licenses existing under current copyright law. See supra Part 
II.A.2. 
 99.  This is the existing standard Copyright Royalty Judges follow for determining royalties under 
the existing compulsory license exceptions. See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A)–(D) (2012). It is also contem-
plated that copyright owners may participate in the royalty setting process. See id. § 804(a), (b)(4). 
 100.  The Copyright Office effectively acts like a collective licensing agency as used in the Nordic 
Countries and as recommended by the proposed Copyright Office pilot program. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 101.  The Copyright Office keeps a record of all authorized digital collections, the works included 
within them, and the owners of each work. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 102.  This same incentive is central to existing compulsory licenses. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 103.  A common problem with collective licensing approaches—that royalties are collected without 
being redistributed—becomes a financial boon for the Copyright Office. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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digital collections to ensure that end-users are not able to infringe upon the 
owner’s exclusive rights and to terminate repeat infringers from accessing 
the digital collection.104 The second requirement is that digital collections 
must accommodate standard technological measures designed to identify 
and protect works such as watermarks, copyright notices, and encryption 
technology.105 The final requirement is that digitizing parties must imple-
ment access control and copy control measures of their own design—meet-
ing or exceeding industry standards106—to prevent end-users from hacking 
the digital collection, downloading works without authorization, or other-
wise infringing the rights of copyright owners.107 
Copyright Owners can also have their works removed from a digital 
collection by notifying the Copyright Office, who would then notify the dig-
itizing party or parties who include the work in a digital collection that they 
must remove the work from the collection as soon as reasonably possible and 
notify the Copyright Office and the copyright owner of the removal.108 The 
work must then remain down unless and until the copyright owner and the 
digitizing party come to a separate agreement.109 The exception would also 
allow copyright owners to impose use limitations on digitizing parties and, 
or, digital collections by contacting the Copyright Office or the digitizing 
party directly. For example, a copyright owner may allow digitizing parties 
to continue using his or her work, but may require that a portion of the work 
be excluded—perhaps specific paragraphs, pages, or chapters or a percent-
age of the total work—from a digital collection.110 The copyright owner may 
impose this condition on digital collections individually, or he or she may 
set this requirement with the Copyright Office, thereby imposing the condi-
tion on every digital collection including his or her work. 
 
 104.  This requirement is inspired by a similar one imposed on ISPs as part of the safe-harbors as 
described above. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i); see supra Part II.A.2. 
 105.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i); see also supra Part II.A.2. 
 106.  The technological measures required for access and copy control measures under this exception 
may be an area in which the Copyright Office should promulgate more definitive rules. See infra Part 
III.B.2. 
 107.  This brings works included in digital collections under the protection of Section 1201 of the 
Copyright Act which makes it illegal to circumvent access controls or traffic services and devices de-
signed to circumvent access or copy controls protecting a work. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)–(b). 
 108.  The Copyright Office will keep a record of all authorized digital collections and the works 
included within them and will communicate between copyright owners and digitizing parties. See infra 
Part III.B.1. 
 109.  The “take-down procedures” included here track those used for ISPs. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g); 
see also supra Part II.A.2. 
 110.  Google Books currently allows copyright owners to dictate whether their works are available 
in full, in limited previews, or in snippet views; this exception affords copyright owners the same power. 
See What You’ll See When You Search on Google Books, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books. 
google.com/googlebooks/library/screenshots.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2016). 
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B. Administering the Proposed Exception 
1. Database Established & Managed by the Copyright Office 
The proposed exception facilitates the development of a comprehensive 
database within the Copyright Office containing the information that digit-
izing parties are required to submit, which includes a digital copy of each 
work included in a digital collection, any known copyright information per-
taining to each work, and intended uses and purposes of digital collections.111 
This information can rejuvenate current Copyright Office records and serve 
as a foundation for a searchable, digital database of copyright ownership in-
formation.112 The Copyright Office is suited to manage this data better than 
an independent agency because they will allow access to every entity, are 
less likely to be biased, and do not face the potential of going out of busi-
ness.113 The database will also enable the Copyright Office to act as a middle 
man for the collection and distribution of royalty funds, allow copyright 
owners to track and manage the use of their works in digital collections, and 
enable parties wishing to use copyright protected works to more easily iden-
tify and locate copyright owners.114 
The digital database will also enable the Copyright Office to serve its 
intermediate roles in royalty distribution and removal of works from digital 
collections and to police digital collections to ensure they are adhering to the 
requirements and qualifications of the exception. For example, the Copyright 
Office may find that a digitizing party is not adhering to its approved in-
tended use or purpose and should no longer be eligible to benefit from this 
exception. Continual or numerous request from individual copyright owners 
for removal of their works from a given digital collection may also indicate 
that the digital collection is not serving a societally beneficial purpose or that 
there are other reasons to reconsider the authorized digital collection. 
 
 111.  See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.3. 
 112.  See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 114TH CONG., REFORM OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFF. (published Dec. 8, 2016), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ Copyright-Re-
form.pdf [hereinafter H.R. JUDICIARY COMM.] (recommending that the Copyright Office establish and 
maintain “a searchable, digital database of historical and current copyright ownership information”); see 
also Samuelson, supra note 9, at 502–04 (discussing the deficiencies of the Copyright Office’s current 
records). 
 113.  See Author’s Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (expressing con-
cern over allowing a private entity to control this data and to represent copyright owners); see also Oberle, 
supra note 29, at 776 (discussing an ideal archive run by the government and the benefits over a privately-
run database). 
 114.  See supra Part III.A.3 (describing the procedure for having a work removed from a digital col-
lection). 
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2. Administrative Power Granted to the Copyright Office 
The Copyright Office would be granted all powers necessary to imple-
ment and administer this exception including the ability to promulgate rules, 
policies, and interpretations relating to the exception. The Copyright Office 
may particularly wish to undergo rulemaking procedures to determine what 
factors are relevant to a finding of impossibility and what Recommended 
Searches should be required for a reasonably diligent attempt to locate and 
contact copyright owners.115 The exception requires a showing of the impos-
sibility of obtaining permission from copyright owners based on the circum-
stance and contemplates that the Copyright Office will find impossibility 
based on the digitizing party’s attempts to locate or contact authors and the 
specifics of the use of the digital collection.116 While there are several cases 
pertaining to digital collections that may guide the Copyright Office’s im-
possibility determination,117 they do not ideally track the requirement of the 
exception and the Copyright Office would likely be better served creating a 
rule for the finding rather than undertaking an ad hoc determination for every 
digitizing party. 
The exception is also embedded with the fair use standard in that a dig-
ital collection cannot enable end-users to use a digital work in any manner 
that infringes upon the copyright owners rights—i.e., in a manner that is be-
yond a fair use.118 Digitizing parties may not be able to accurately determine 
what would constitute a fair use by end-users of their collection given the 
often unpredictable nature of the fair use analysis.119 Additional guidance 
from the Copyright Office would enable digitizing parties to more effectively 
promote access to digitized works without facilitating infringement. 
The Copyright Office would also be granted the power to hold hearings 
to determine whether authorized parties are in compliance with the excep-
tion.120 A copyright owner may bring potential violations of any of the re-
quirements of this exception to the attention of the Copyright Office and par-
ticipate in an administrative proceeding to determine whether a digitizing 
party can benefit from the exception. A digitizing party found to no longer 
 
 115.  The Copyright Office’s recommendation for establishing a limited liability approach contem-
plates similar rules. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 116.  See supra Part III.A.1 (describing the required search for copyright owners and the information 
that digitizing parties must submit in the authorization process). 
 117.  See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 34–41. 
 118.  See supra Part III pmbl. 
 119.  See supra Part II.A.1 (referring to several fair use cases, with varying outcomes, involving 
digital collections that may benefit from this exception). 
 120.  The precise contours of the administrative procedure required to determine whether a digitizing 
party is no longer in compliance with the exception is beyond the purview of this note. The Copyright 
Office would likely promulgate rules governing the adjudicative procedure. 
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comply with the requirements of this exception is simply barred from raising 
the exception as a defense in any subsequent litigation. Nothing in the ex-
ception is intended to abridge or modify copyright infringement actions, in-
cluding the ability of the digitizing party to rely on another existing exception 
or fair use. It is also contemplated that a copyright owner may initiate an 
infringement action without first obtaining a Copyright Office eligibility de-
termination and litigate whether the digitizing party can rely on the exception 
in the infringement action.121 
C. Justification for the Exception-Based Approach 
There is no doubt that digital collections promote the distribution of 
creative works and would be beneficial to society. The issue becomes how 
we can continue to protect authors’ exclusive rights in the digital environ-
ment. This exception addresses the issue without significantly departing 
from established copyright law or previously proposed amendments. In fact, 
the only novel portion of the exception is the requirement that a digitizing 
party shows impossibility in front of the Copyright Office prior to being eli-
gible for the exception. This requirement is not unreasonable, however, be-
cause the Copyright Office and others have identified several factors that 
render it impossible to obtain permission from large amounts of copyright 
owners,122 and allowing the Copyright Office to pre-approve projects has 
been contemplated.123 
Mechanisms used for administering existing compulsory licenses, such 
as royalties set by Copyright Royalty Judges, and for ISP safe-harbors, such 
as data management and take-down procedures, are directly applicable to the 
proposed exception and inform how Congress should structure the collection 
and distribution of royalties owed to copyright owners and the safe guards 
needed to protect the exclusive rights in the digital format. The exception 
adopted the existing mechanisms to the extent possible, modifying them only 
to give the Copyright Office a more prominent role in serving as an interme-
diate between copyright owners and parties establishing the digital collec-
tions.124 
 
 121.  It is contemplated that the Copyright Office’s determination of eligibility would act as a rebut-
table presumption of no infringement. It may be the case that digitizing parties seek an affirmative deter-
mination prior to engaging in litigation. 
 122.  AMER & WESTON, supra note 5, at 5, 74. 
 123.  In the collective licensing program currently proposed by the Copyright Office, collective li-
censing organizations would be pre-approved to represent classes of copyright owners. Id. at 104; see 
also supra Part II.B.2. Here, the Copyright Office represents the class of copyright owners and pre-ap-
proves given uses of protected works. 
 124.  For example, in the current ISP safe-harbors, the ISP acts as an intermediate between copyright 
owners and end-user when there is an infringement dispute, see supra Part II.A.2, whereas in the proposed 
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The exception places a significant burden on digitizing parties by re-
quiring the reasonably diligent search for copyright owners, the process of 
obtaining authorization from the Copyright Office, and the payment of rea-
sonably royalties. Digitizing parties may very well choose to rely on fair use, 
rather than this exception, because it requires less of them and allows them 
to use protected works with fewer limitations and without paying royalties. 
The goal of the exception was not to replace fair use, but to allow a more 
predictable system to encourage those digitizing parties unwilling to risk fair 
use to pursue digitization projects. The exception also enables projects that 
would have a hard time proving a fair use defense due to their commercial 
nature, which is not barred under this exception.125 This is an advantage of 
the exception-based approach because private entities attempting to make a 
commercially profitable database are realistically the entities best suited to 
endure the significant financial investment required to generate digital col-
lections. Given the “enormous cultural, intellectual, and educational bene-
fits” associated with greater access to expressive works through digital col-
lections,126 a goal of this exception is to foster rapid investment in and 
development of digitization projects. 
The Copyright Office has much to gain through the proposed exception 
and the investments of private entities. The House of Representatives Judi-
ciary Committee is currently recommending that the Copyright Office estab-
lish and maintain “a searchable, digital database of historical and current 
copyright ownership information,”127 and the data that will be submitted to 
the Office through this exception, including digital copies of works, will fa-
cilitate the establishment of such a database. The exception would also allow 
the Copyright Office to collect royalty payments for works with unknown 
authors which will allow them to maintain the database and otherwise invest 
in improving the Copyright Office to fulfill the needs of the digital era. Im-
provement of the Copyright Office records also serve the public by allowing 
for more accurate and complete records of copyright status and ownership 
interests. The public will more easily discern which works are in the public 
domain and therefore free for public use, which remain protected, and whom 
to contact for permission to use protected works. This clarity will lead to 
more exploitation of works without fear of potential infringement and enable 
 
exception, the Copyright Office facilitates communication between the digitizing party and copyright 
owners. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 125.  Recall that the first factor of the fair use analysis points towards an unfair use when it is com-
mercial in nature. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 126.  Sag, supra note 8, at 73. 
 127.  H.R. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 112. 
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development of new creative works inspired by, derived from, or based upon 
the collective knowledge contained in existing works. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The exception-based legislative proposal outlined above promotes the 
progress of science and the arts by facilitating the development of digital 
collections of copyright protected works and provides copyright owners with 
reasonable compensation for the inclusion and use of their works in such 
digital collections. It also protects copyright owners’ exclusive rights by re-
quiring digital collections to be protected by copy and access control tech-
nologies and by allowing copyright owners to remove their works from the 
digital collection. Most importantly, the exception encourages investment in 
digitization of works, which will preserve the collective knowledge of man-
kind as expressed in copyright protected works and allow greater access for 
individuals to tap into the collective knowledge. 
Congress should implement the proposed exception because digital col-
lections of works are the next chapter in the preservation and dissemination 
of copyright protected works and the exception outlines a “desperately 
needed” solution to problem of promoting digitization projects while con-
currently protecting the exclusive rights of copyright owners,128 thereby pre-
serving the primary goal of copyright law: to promote the progress of science 




 128.  AMER & WESTON, supra note 5, at 105. 
 129.  Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015). 
